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Is It Law or Something Else?:     A 
Divided Judiciary in the Application of 
Fraudulent Transfer Law under § 546(e) 
of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
Jaclyn Weissgerber

 
 
Where two groups of identical subjects are presented with the same 
set of stimuli, and they respond differently, an explanation is needed.  
Further, when the subjects do not merely respond randomly, but rather in 
one of two specific ways, this need for explanation becomes more 
apparent.  In this Note, I will focus on the divide between bankruptcy 
judges and federal appellate judges in their interpretation of § 546(e) of 
the Bankruptcy Code,
1
 as applied to leveraged buyouts in bankruptcy, in 
the determination of whether creditors may use fraudulent conveyance 
law to recover funds for the bankruptcy estate. 
My position is that there is a defined and radical difference in 
interpretation of § 546(e), commonly known as the ‘settlement payment 
exception,’ as between bankruptcy judges and the federal appellate 
judges reviewing these decisions.
2
  In order to explore this divergence, I 
conducted an empirical study to determine the existence and magnitude 
of this division based on the court opinions within each federal circuit.  
My goal was first to describe this division and then to explain why 
bankruptcy judges and federal appellate judges have adopted such 
radically different positions.  A review of all of the § 546(e) case law 
demonstrates that eighty-six percent of federal appellate judges hold that 
a trustee may not use fraudulent conveyance law to avoid transfers made 
to shareholders in the context of a leveraged buyout as a result of § 
 
   Law Clerk to the Honorable Diane Davis, United States Bankruptcy Judge, 
N.D.N.Y.; J.D. Pace University School of Law; B.S. State University of New York at 
Geneseo.  My sincerest gratitude to Professor David Cohen for providing the valuable 
commentary and guidance that made this work possible. 
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2012) (“Bankruptcy Code”). Unless otherwise indicated, 
all further section references are to the Bankruptcy Code.  
2. The study excluded district court decisions because there was no clear trend of 
interpretation of § 546(e).  The data are current as of August 2014. 
1
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546(e).
3
  By comparison, only thirty-seven percent of bankruptcy judges 
autonomously hold that a trustee may not use fraudulent conveyance law 
as a result of § 546(e).
4
  This means that sixty-three percent of 
bankruptcy judges hold that § 546(e) does not apply to protect payments 
made to shareholders in the context of a leveraged buyout.  Certainly, the 
different positions taken by bankruptcy judges and federal appellate 
judges cannot be justified merely by the statutory language.  Although all 
judges use formal legal reasoning as a vehicle to explain the outcomes, 
the difference in outcomes must mean that there are other, unarticulated 
factors driving these decisions. 
In Part I of this Note, I will provide a general overview of leveraged 
buyouts.  The discussion of how and why LBOs are implemented is 
particularly relevant to the application of fraudulent transfer analysis.  In 
Part II, I will discuss fraudulent transfer law as defined by the 
Bankruptcy Code.  In Part III, I will discuss which transfers within the 
LBO should be attacked under fraudulent transfer law and why; this 
section will focus on the various stakes of the parties involved in the 
leveraged buyout transaction.  I will provide an overview of the specific 
factors that bankruptcy and federal appellate judges may or may not 
consider in applying § 546(e).  Part IV will then more thoroughly define 
§ 546(e) and its application to fraudulent transfer analysis.  In Part V, I 
will describe the split of interpretation of § 546(e) as demonstrated by an 
empirical study.  In Part VI, I will discuss the formal legal rules for the 
disagreement among the bankruptcy and federal appellate judges.  
Finally, in Part VII, I propose several explanations for the remarkably 
divided application of the statute. 
 
I. What is an LBO? 
 
A leveraged buyout (“LBO”) is a corporate acquisition that is 
financed through the use of debt.
5
  In the most basic form of the 
transaction, a purchasing entity (“Acquirer”) finances the purchase of a 
 
3. See infra Appendix I.  12/14 (86%) appellate decisions held that § 546(e) 
applied. 
4. See infra Appendix I.  10/27 (63%) autonomous bankruptcy decisions held that § 
546(e) applied. 
5. See Anthony Michael Sabino, Applying the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances to 
Bankrupt Leveraged Buyouts: The Bankruptcy Code's Increasing Leverage over Failed 
LBOs, 69 N.D. L. REV. 15, 20 (1993). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/8
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target corporation (“Target”) by using the Target’s assets to secure a loan 
from a lending institution (“Lender”).6  The loan from the Lender is then 
used to purchase the shares of stock from the Target’s stockholders, 
thereby transferring ownership of the Target to the Acquirer.
7
  Through 
these means, “investors convert much of the equity of the corporation 
into debt, cash out the prior stockholders at a premium, and gain control 
of a highly leveraged corporation.”8 
The increasing popularity of the leveraged buyout structure is a 
result of the financial feasibility of acquisition;
9
 there is a minimal capital 
requirement where the majority of the purchase price is financed by 
borrowing against the assets of the Target.
10
  Therefore, “[w]hen credit is 
cheap and the economy is growing, highly leveraged buyouts represent 
the optimal means by which private equity firms acquire target 
companies.”11  However, as is typical of any corporation operating with a 
high debt to equity ratio, even a slight change in economic conditions 
can pose a significant risk of bankruptcy to the Target.
12
  Given the 
 
6. See id.; see also David Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. 
L. REV. 73, 74 (1985); Emily L. Sherwin, Creditors' Rights Against Participants in a 
Leveraged Buyout, 72 MINN. L. REV. 449, 449 (1988). 
7. See Sherwin, supra note 6, at 450.  This structure represents the archetypical 
LBO.  Although there are many variations of the archetypical form, the transaction 
remains substantively the same.  See Neil M. Garfinkel, Note, No Way Out: Section 
546(e) is No Escape for the Public Shareholder of a Failed LBO, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 51, 53 (1991) (“There are many variations upon this basic transaction scenario, but 
in each of them, the acquired company's debt to equity ratio has increased, and its number 
of shareholders has usually decreased.”). 
8. Raymond J. Blackwood, Note, Applying Fraudulent Conveyance Law to 
Leveraged Buyouts, 42 DUKE L.J. 340, 342 (1992). 
9. See Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout 
Bankruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap Solution, 2011 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 128-30 (2010); see also Samir D. Parikh, Saving Fraudulent 
Transfer Law, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 305 (2012) (noting that within the most recent 
decades “[p]rivate equity firms [have come to] rely on leveraged buyouts in order to 
acquire target companies.”). 
10. Minimal liquidity is required where the security interest permits “borrow[ing] 
an amount that represents approximately 60 to 90 percent of the purchase price.”  Parikh, 
supra note 9, at 311. 
11. Parikh, supra note 9, at 307; see Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 9, at 124 
(“During the credit boom that started in 2003 and peaked in 2007, banks issued a 
remarkable volume of loans and bonds, and an astounding volume of highly leveraged 
transactions were financed.”). 
12. See John H. Ginsberg et al., Befuddlement Betwixt Two Fulcrums: Calibrating 
the Scales of Justice to Ascertain Fraudulent Transfers in Leveraged Buyouts, 19 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 71, 75 (2011) (“As the Third Circuit put it, ‘[t]he problem universal 
3
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recent liquidity crisis
13—and the corresponding credit crunch14—it is not 
difficult to imagine that servicing this debt burden became difficult for 
many corporations.
15
  For this reason, “[t]he problem universal to all 
LBOs—characterized by their high debt relative to equity interest—is 
that they are less able to weather temporary financial storms because 
debt demands are less flexible than equity interest.”16  Arguably, the 
LBO structure has caused many corporations to file for bankruptcy in 
recent years.
17
 
The leveraged buyout is a prime example of a ‘high risk, high 
reward’ business transaction.  Although the debt incurred as a result of 
the acquisition often leaves minimal cash flow for continued Target 
operations, the utility of the LBO is based on the future expected benefit 
to the Acquirer rather than an immediate increase in wealth of the Target.  
The Acquirer stands to profit considerably from its ability to successfully 
restructure the Target—typically an underperforming or undervalued 
corporation—and later sell it at a premium.18  The Acquirer maximizes 
the return on its corporate knowledge and expertise by replacing Target 
management, restructuring the firm’s assets, and utilizing the synergies 
 
to all LBOs—characterized by their high debt relative to equity interest—is that they are 
less able to weather temporary financial storms because debt demands are less flexible 
than equity interest.’” (quoting Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc’ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 
635, 647 (3d Cir. 1991))). 
13. See Michael D. Bordo, An Historical Perspective on the Crisis of 2007-2008 2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14569, 2008), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14569.pdf (discussing how the international financial crisis 
began with liquidity issues in the U.S.). 
14. Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 1, 1 (2008). 
15. In the wake of the liquidity crisis, the number of Chapter 11 filings has 
consistently increased each year.  The comparative percent changes indicate 29.7%, 
33.3%, and 27.4% increases for the years 2008, 2009, 2010 respectively. See Table F: 
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts––Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, Terminated and Pending 
During the 12-Month Periods Ending March 31, 2009 and 2010, U.S. COURTS.GOV, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2010
/0310_f.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
16. Ginsberg et al., supra note 12, at 75 (quoting Mellon Bank, 945 F.2d at 647). 
17. See HEINO MEERKATT & HEINRICH LIECHTENSTEIN, BOS. CONSULTING GRP., 
GET READY FOR THE PRIVATE-EQUITY SHAKEOUT: WILL THIS BE THE NEXT SHOCK TO THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY? 1, 3-4 (Dec. 2008), 
http://www.iese.edu/en/files/PrivateEquityWhitePaper.pdf; see also Anthony Michael 
Sabino, supra note 5, at 36; Nelson D. Schwartz, Corporate Debt Coming Due May 
Squeeze Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/business/16debt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
18. Carlson, supra note 6, at 79. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/8
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between the Target and other firms owned by the Acquirer.
19
  “If the 
corporation is able to pay off the LBO debt . . . [the Acquirer] enjoy[s] 
huge profits . . . hav[ing] purchased full equity participation in a 
successful company with a small expenditure of [its] own funds.”20  
Therefore, in the context of the fraudulent transfer analysis, it should be 
noted that it is typically the potential profitability of the Target that 
motivates the acquisition, rather than actual intent to defraud.
21
 
 
II. Fraudulent Transfer Law 
 
Given the high risk to the Target as a result of the enormous debt 
burden,
22
 a substantial number of these acquisitions result in 
bankruptcy.
23
  Fraudulent transfer law becomes relevant to these 
corporate bankruptcies when, in light of the priority of distribution of 
assets in bankruptcy, the overwhelming secured claims of the Lender 
leave little to no potential of recovery for unsecured creditors.
24
  “The 
purpose of fraudulent transfer law is to prevent a debtor from transferring 
away valuable assets in exchange for less than adequate value, if the 
transfer leaves insufficient assets to compensate honest creditors.”25  
Therefore, where the Target “is left in inadequate financial condition 
following a buyout and later fails, unpaid creditors may assert claims 
against parties who participated in the buyout,” perhaps most effectively 
through the use of fraudulent conveyance statutes.
26
  If the transactions 
 
19. See James F. Queenan, Jr., The Collapsed Leveraged Buyout and the Trustee in 
Bankruptcy, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 10 (1989); see also Myron M. Sheinfeld & David H. 
Goodman, LBO: Legitimate Business Organization or Large Bankruptcy Opportunity?, 2 
J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 799, 800-01 (1993). 
20. Blackwood, supra note 8, at 342. 
21. See Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.1988) (“We cannot believe that 
virtually all LBOs are designed to ‘hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.’”).  As such, 
fraudulent transfer analysis in this context is typically centered on constructive fraud.  
However, it should be noted that actual intent to defraud, while tremendously difficult to 
prove, typically defeats the § 546(e) affirmative defense.  See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012) 
(excluding actual fraud by reference to § 548(a)(1)(A)). 
22. See Parikh, supra note 9, at 307. 
23. Id. at 308; see Schwartz, supra note 17. 
24. See Stephen E. Schilling, Ambiguity and Bad Policy: Should § 546(e) of the 
Bankruptcy Code Be Applied to Leveraged Buyouts of Private Companies?, 9 DEPAUL 
BUS. & COM. L.J. 471, 478 (2011). 
25. In re Bay Plastics, Inc., 187 B.R. 315, 322 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (citations 
omitted). 
26. See Sherwin, supra note 6, at 452. 
5
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within the LBO fall within the statutory definition of a fraudulent 
conveyance,
27
 the transactions are subject to avoidance and funds may be 
brought back into the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of unsecured 
creditors.
28
 
The legal bases for avoiding the LBO transfer as a fraudulent 
conveyance are embodied in the Bankruptcy Code; either directly 
through the operation of § 548
29
 or through § 544(b),
30
 which permits a 
Trustee
31
 to use state legislation, including the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act (“UFCA”), in a minority of states, and the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), in a vast majority of states, to avoid 
the transaction.
32
 
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code permits the avoidance of both 
actually fraudulent and constructively fraudulent transfers within two 
years prior to the date the bankruptcy petition is filed.
33
  A transfer may 
be avoided under § 548(a)(1)(A) where the Trustee can prove actual 
fraud on the part of a party who makes a transfer or incurs an obligation 
with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.”34  However, proving 
actual intent can be difficult given the general business objectives of the 
Acquirer in conducting the LBO.
35
  Alternatively, § 548(a)(1)(B) 
provides an opportunity for a Trustee, on behalf of the class of unsecured 
 
27. There is ongoing debate as to whether fraudulent conveyance law should apply 
in the context of a leveraged buyout. See Blackwood, supra note 8, at 350 (“[B]ecause 
fraudulent conveyance laws arose out of a simplistic and outdated sixteenth-century 
setting, applying such laws to transactions as modern and complex as the LBO is wholly 
inappropriate.”). 
28. See Sherwin, supra note 6, at 464 (“The remedy provided to creditors, or to a 
bankruptcy trustee [or debtor in possession] on creditors' behalf, is to avoid the transfer 
and recover the property or its value from transferees [for the bankruptcy estate].”); see 
also 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2012); Schilling, supra note 24, at 478. 
29. 11 U.S.C. § 548. 
30. Id. § 544(b). 
31. In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the debtor in possession may exercise all the rights 
of the trustee, aside from the right to receive compensation.  Id. § 1107(a).  “Trustee” will 
hereinafter encompass both a trustee and debtor in possession. 
32. A Trustee may invoke the Bankruptcy Code, relevant state law, or both.  See 
Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 53-56. 
33. 11 U.S.C. § 548. 
34. Id. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
35. Proving actual fraud also entails a higher evidentiary burden.  See Garfinkel, 
supra note 7, at 56 (“Because of the difficulty of proving scienter, however, most trustees 
have sought to avoid the leveraged buyout through the constructive fraud provisions.”).  
It should, however, be noted that proof of actual fraud would render § 546(e) 
inapplicable.  See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/8
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creditors, to prove constructive fraud in order to avoid the transfer.
36
  A 
transfer of property or obligation incurred is constructively fraudulent if, 
inter alia, the debtor “received less than a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and . . . was insolvent on the 
date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or 
became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation.”37 
In addition, a Trustee can invoke state fraudulent conveyance law 
under § 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits a Trustee to 
“avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any 
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law.”38  
As in the case of § 548(a)(1)(A), proof of actual fraud under state law 
requires “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.”39  However, for the 
same reasons stated above, actual intent is exceedingly difficult to prove.  
Alternatively, proof of constructive fraud requires analysis under a two-
pronged test.
40
  Under the first prong, the Trustee must demonstrate that 
the transfer was not made for “fair consideration” (under the UFCA)41 or 
that it was not made for a “reasonably equivalent value” (under the 
UFTA).
42
  Where the first prong is satisfied, the court must then 
determine whether “the debtor was either (a) insolvent at the time of the 
transaction or rendered insolvent by the transaction,
43
 or (b) left with 
 
36. Id. § 548(a)(1)(B). 
37. Id. 
38. Id. § 544(b)(1).  But cf. In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 503 B.R. 348, 355  (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that § 546(e) does not apply to lawsuits brought under state 
fraudulent transfer laws). 
39. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 58 (2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
40. See Kevin J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1497 (1987). 
41. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 3, 7A U.L.A. 277 (2006).  The 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws no longer publishes the 
UFCA.   However, the basic structure and approach of the UFCA are preserved in the 
UFTA.  Only five states (including New York) still utilize the UFCA.  See, e.g.,  N.Y. 
DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 270-81 (McKinney 2014); see also Blackwood, supra note 8, at 
362-63 (Under the UFCA fair consideration analysis, where the “purpose of fraudulent 
conveyance law is to protect creditors from unwarranted depletion of the debtor's assets, 
the sufficiency of the consideration is viewed from the perspective of the LBO target's 
creditors.”).  For the New York provision for “fair consideration” see, N.Y. DEBT. & 
CRED. LAW § 272. 
42. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 58 (2006). 
43. See Liss, supra note 40, at 1497 & n.42 (citing UNIF. FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCE ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1985); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a), 
7A U.L.A. 657 (1985)). 
7
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unreasonably small capital.”44  Where both prongs have been met, the 
transfer can be avoided and the funds brought back into the bankruptcy 
estate.
45
 
 
III.   Which Are the Alleged Fraudulent Transfers Subject to Avoidance? 
 
A.  Which Transfers Should be Attacked? 
 
The analysis of this multiparty transaction within the scope of 
fraudulent conveyance law is especially difficult where fraudulent 
conveyance statutes were drafted to address a standard two-party 
transaction.
46
  Within the context of an LBO, the application of 
fraudulent transfer law requires a determination of which transfers 
should be avoided, and therefore recovered by the estate for the benefit 
of creditors.  Although this analysis may be affected by the specific 
structure of the LBO,
47
 courts have found that certain payments made by 
a debtor either to the Lender or to the selling shareholder may be 
avoided.
48
  Therefore, the two major foci of the fraudulent transfer 
analysis within the archetypical leveraged buyout include the lender-
target mutual obligations and payments to selling shareholders. 
In the most basic form of the LBO, the Lender typically makes a 
loan in exchange for a security interest in the assets of the Target, as 
directed by the Acquirer. Where the loan funds are deposited directly 
with the Target, the Target appears to have incurred a clear obligation (to 
repay the loan), and at first glance, appears to have received a reasonably 
equivalent value (the loan proceeds).  However, both the Target’s 
assumption of the obligation to repay the loan and the Target’s transfer 
of a security interest in its assets to the Lender are potentially fraudulent 
transfers.
49
  Although the Target’s assets have been pledged to secure 
 
44. Id. at 1497 & n.43 (citing UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 5, 7A U.L.A. 
504 (1985); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2)(i), 7A U.L.A. 652 (1985)). 
45. Id. at 1497. 
46. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012); see also Daniel J. Merrett & John H. Chase, 
Safe Harbor Supernova: Is Section 546(e)’s Stellar Protection of Private LBO 
Transactions About to Burn Out? 21 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 Art. 1, n.161 (2012). 
47. For further discussion of this topic, see infra Part VII.B. 
48. See Sabino, supra note 5, at 26.  For a discussion of the collapsing doctrine, see 
infra Part VII.B. 
49. There is also the argument that payments to selling shareholders may be 
deemed fraudulent on the theory that Target management authorized the overpayment for 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/8
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repayment of the loan, the loan funds received immediately flow through 
the Target to selling shareholders; the Target does not beneficially retain 
the loan proceeds.
50
  Rather, the Target appears to act as a mere conduit 
as distributor of funds to the selling shareholders at the direction of the 
Acquirer.  The implications of this structured transaction will be 
discussed in Part V, infra. 
 
B.   Why Should the Transfer be Avoided? 
 
The purpose of applying fraudulent transfer law in order to employ 
the avoidance powers is to “level the playing field among similarly 
situated creditors[,] . . . to maximize the amount of property available to 
a debtor’s general unsecured creditors[,]”51 and to facilitate the success 
of the reorganization.  However, the question then becomes, why level 
the playing field among creditors?  Why protect the unsecured creditors 
at all?  This is the root of the divide between bankruptcy judges and 
federal appellate judges and will be discussed in Parts VI and VII, infra. 
However, to understand the arguments that perpetuate this divide, one 
must first consider the circumstances of the players involved in, and 
affected by, the LBO. 
 
1.   Target Shareholders 
 
First, recall that prior to the leveraged buyout the Target was 
identified by the Acquirer as an underperforming corporation.  It seems 
inequitable that the Target shareholders should receive priority in 
corporate distribution when they would have been residual claimants in 
the bankruptcy in the absence of the LBO.  Furthermore, these 
shareholders have not only been paid for their shares, but also have been 
paid at a premium despite having assumed absolutely no risk.
52
  “The 
selling shareholders receive their price at closing and have no continuing 
stake in the target, and thus no exposure to risk of leverage-induced 
 
outstanding shares (at a premium) despite the apparent financial infeasibility, evidenced 
by the resulting bankruptcy.  See Parikh, supra note 9, at 308.  This argument will not be 
explored in this Note. 
50. See Carlson, supra note 6, at 75. 
51. Merrett & Chase, supra note 46. 
52. See Queenan, supra note 19, at 5. 
9
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insolvency.”53  Therefore, there is an impropriety where, “in anticipation 
of a liquidation, shareholders extract value from the company at a time 
when the general creditors have not been paid.”54 
 
2.   Secured Creditor 
 
Lenders, on another hand, are protected by their security interests 
and have “voluntarily assume[d] credit-risk in pursuit of commensurate 
interest rates providing a favorable risk-adjusted return.”55  Lenders can 
“scrutinize the transaction before entering into it[] . . . [and] respond by 
increasing the price—the interest rate—charged for credit because of the 
increased risk of fraudulent conveyance attack.”56  Therefore, the Lender 
is in the best position to foresee the bankruptcy where it has the 
opportunity to analyze the current financial state of the Target
57
 prior to 
issuance of the loan.  The Lender may then take corresponding 
precautions, such as adjusting the interest rate and structuring the 
transaction to protect its own interests in the event of a bankruptcy.  
Conveniently enough, the security interest in the collateral provides the 
Lender with priority of distribution in the bankruptcy estate.
58
 
 
3.   Acquirer 
 
The Acquirer obviously draws various financial benefits from the 
LBO where the potential profit is what motivates the acquisition.  Where 
the Acquiring management is able to manage successfully the operations 
of the newly acquired Target so as to produce a profit, debt can be paid 
off and Acquiring management enjoys a corresponding increase in the 
value of its equity.
59
  Additionally, where the “the buyout dramatically 
 
53. Ginsberg et al., supra note 12, at 76. 
54. Carlson, supra note 6, at 85. 
55. Ginsberg et al., supra note 12, at 76. 
56. Liss, supra note 40, at 1513. 
57. Depending on the structure of the transaction, the Lender may also analyze the 
financial state of the Acquirer as well.  See generally Carlson, supra note 6, at 81-83 
(discussing different forms of LBOs). 
58. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2012); see also Irina V. Fox, Settlement Payment Exception to 
Avoidance Powers in Bankruptcy: An Unsettling Method of Avoiding Recovery from 
Shareholders of Failed Closely Held Company LBOs, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571, 575 
(2010). 
59. See Ginsberg et al., supra note 12, at 77. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/8
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narrows the ownership base, any appreciation in the company’s equity is 
thereby divided among fewer parties.”60  In the event that Acquiring 
management is not able to successfully produce a profit as a result of the 
overwhelming debt burden, the resulting loss is limited by the fact that 
the financing for the LBO came from a loan secured by the assets of the 
Target; little to no equity necessarily has been lost.
61
  The “worst case 
scenario for [Acquiring management] is that they will lose their market 
investment in the LBO if they are unable to sell their position before the 
[T]arget’s failure.”62 
 
4. Unsecured Creditor 
 
Therefore, unsecured creditors assume the risk of the bankruptcy 
associated with the LBO.  This is the definition of being unsecured, and 
therefore holds true whether there is an LBO or not.  However, where the 
positive net worth of the Target has been reduced by the secured debt, 
the Lender’s priority secured liens additionally minimize, if not 
eliminate, the recovery potential for these unsecured creditors.  Of 
course, there are both sophisticated and unsophisticated unsecured 
creditors.  Yet, while the sophisticated unsecured creditors typically 
manage bankruptcy risk by charging risk adjusted interest rates or 
negotiating bond covenants, unsophisticated, unsecured creditors have 
little knowledge or access to information, and ultimately, have no 
bargaining power.
63
  Where the majority of unsecured creditors are 
unsophisticated, the application of fraudulent conveyance law may be 
especially appropriate where these individuals “are poorly positioned to 
limit such risk, not being party to the LBO and being unshielded by any 
good proxy among the parties.”64 
Under the Bankruptcy Code and state law, courts have an effective 
 
60. Parikh, supra note 9, at 313 (citing Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 52-53); see also 
Queenan, supra note 19, at 1. 
61. “Most important to the acquiring group . . . is the gradual increase in their 
equity in the target. As the income stream repays the debt, the controlling group's 
investment becomes less and less leveraged.”  Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 53.  However, 
the inference is that where the income stream is unable to repay the massive debt incurred 
by the Target, as evidenced by the resulting bankruptcy, the Acquirers have little to no 
equity to lose. 
62. Fox, supra note 58, at 580. 
63. See Liss, supra note 40, at 1512. 
64. Ginsberg et. al., supra note 12, at 75. 
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tool to avoid fraudulent transfers in order to protect the interests of 
creditors of the bankruptcy estate.  There is substantial case law that 
demonstrates that courts have used these tools frequently to maximize 
the recovery for the estate in liquidation and reorganization.  Yet 
remarkably, the Bankruptcy Code includes a provision that leads some 
judges to hold that fraudulent transfer law is inapplicable to fraudulent 
transfers made in the context of an LBO. 
 
IV.   Settlement Payment Exception 
 
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code has changed the application 
of fraudulent transfer law in the context of an LBO.  Within the past few 
decades,
65
 what was once “a relatively obscure section of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code”66 is now a commonplace defense to creditor suits 
known as the ‘settlement payment exception.’  The ‘settlement payment 
exception’ exempts from avoidance various transfers made during the 
buyout by precluding a Trustee from using § 548, or state law (the UFCA 
or UFTA) through § 544(b) to recover property for the benefit of the 
estate.  Section 546(e) provides that: 
 
(e) Notwithstanding sections 544 . . . 548(a)(1)(B), 
and 548(b) of this title, the trustee may not avoid a 
transfer that is a . . . settlement payment, as defined 
in section 101 or 741 of this title, made by or to (or 
for the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward 
contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, 
financial participant, or securities clearing agency, or 
that is a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) 
a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, 
stockbroker, financial institution, financial 
participant, or securities clearing agency, in 
connection with a securities contract, as defined in 
section 741(7), commodity contract, as defined in 
761(4), or forward contract, that is made before the 
commencement of the case, except under section 
 
65. See Schilling, supra note 24, at 473. 
66. Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 51. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/8
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548(a)(1)(A) of this title.
67
 
 
Recall from Part III that the potentially fraudulent transfers subject 
to avoidance include the Target’s assumption of the obligation to repay 
the loan, the Target’s transfer of a security interest in its assets to the 
Lender, and the contemporaneous payments made to Target 
shareholders.
68
  What this means is that these transfers may be shielded 
from avoidance where any of these transfers are held to constitute a 
settlement payment made by (and to) a financial institution or a transfer 
by (and to) a financial institution in connection with a securities 
contract.
69
  As a result, the major difficulty posed by § 546(e), at least in 
terms of legal formalism, results from two very different interpretations 
of which transfers constitute ‘settlement payments’ and what enterprises 
come within the statutory term, ‘financial institution.’ 
The statutory definition of ‘settlement payment’ is exceptionally 
vague; it is defined only by reference to §§ 101 and 741, neither of which 
provides much more clarity.
70
  Section 101(51A) defines settlement 
payment as “a preliminary settlement payment, a partial settlement 
 
67. 11 U.S.C. § 546 (2012) (emphasis added).  The judicial interpretation of 
“settlement payment” differs slightly from the statutory definition and suggests that a 
“settlement payment” means “the transfer of cash or securities made to complete a 
securities transaction.”  In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 181 F.3d 505, 514-15 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citation omitted). 
68. See supra Part III.  Where the LBO structure requires that such 
contemporaneous payments be made to the shareholders in order to effectuate the 
acquisition, courts “refuse[] to characterize the loans and the buyout as separate 
transactions.”  Matthew T. Kirby et al., Fraudulent Conveyance Concerns in Leveraged 
Buyout Lending, 43 BUS. LAW 27, 42 (1987) (“The transactions were treated as one 
because ‘[t]he two exchanges were part of one integrated transaction[.]’” (quoting United 
States v. Tabor Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1302 (3d Cir. 1986))).  “[T]he payment to 
the shareholders by the buyer of the corporation is deemed a fraudulent conveyance 
because in exchange for the money the shareholders received they provided no value to 
the corporation but merely increased its debt and by doing so pushed it over the brink.”  
Schilling, supra note 24, at 478 (quoting Boyer v. Crown Stock Distribution, Inc., 587 
F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2009)) (emphasis added).  The LBO is typically challenged on 
fraudulent conveyance grounds where funds were merely passed through the debtor, to 
former shareholders.  Therefore, the fraudulent transfer claims are often brought against 
former shareholders, but can also be brought against officers and directors, lenders, and 
financial advisors.  The issue then becomes whether there was actual or constructive 
intent to defraud.  Sherwin, supra note 6, at 452. 
69. See, e.g., In re MacMenamin's Grill Ltd., 450 B.R. 414, 419 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
70. Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656, 675 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998) 
(suggesting that the definition of settlement payment is both “circular and cryptic”). 
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payment, an interim settlement payment, a settlement payment on 
account, a final settlement payment, a net settlement payment, or any 
other similar payment commonly used in the forward contract trade.”71  
Section 741(8), defines ‘settlement payment’ as “a preliminary 
settlement payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim settlement 
payment, a settlement payment on account, a final settlement payment, 
or any other similar payment commonly used in the securities trade.”72  
As various courts have noted, this “definition of ‘settlement payment’ is 
frustratingly self-referential—essentially stating that a ‘settlement 
payment’ is a ‘settlement payment.’”73 
The definition of ‘financial institution’ is also subject to debate, 
despite having a less circular statutory definition.  Section 101(22) of the 
Bankruptcy Code defines a ‘financial institution’ to include all 
“commercial or savings banks . . . savings and loan association[s] [and] . 
. . federally-insured credit union[s],” as well as other entities.74  
Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a financial institution as “[a] 
business, organization, or other entity that manages money, credit, or 
capital, such as a bank, credit union, savings-and-loan association, 
securities broker or dealer, pawnbroker, or investment company.”75  The 
challenge is that the definition of ‘financial institution’ is not subject to 
any explicit limitation. 
The conflict between bankruptcy judges and federal appellate 
judges arises because the definition of ‘settlement payment’ and the 
definition of ‘financial institution’ are not explicitly limited.  The 
absence of definitional clarity has been an issue for to the courts to 
reconcile—or not reconcile—in the interpretation of § 546(e)’s 
application to LBOs. 
 
V.   Bankruptcy Judges v. Federal Appellate Judges 
 
Since 1985, beginning with In re International Gold Bullion 
Exchange, Inc.,
76
 sixty-three percent
77
 of bankruptcy judges have 
 
71. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51A) (emphasis added). 
72. Id. § 741(8) (emphasis added). 
73. In re MacMenamin's, 450 B.R. at 418 (citing In re QSI Holdings, Inc., 571 F.3d 
545 (6th Cir. 2009)). 
74. 11 U.S.C. § 101(22). 
75. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). 
76. 53 B.R. 660 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); see also infra Appendix I. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/8
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interpreted § 546(e) narrowly, thus limiting § 546(e)’s exemption from 
avoidance.  That is, bankruptcy judges have consistently held that § 
546(e) does not protect payments made to shareholders in the context of 
an LBO.  Conversely, since 1990, beginning with Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Charles Schwab & Co.,
78
 eighty-six percent
79
 of federal appellate judges 
have interpreted § 546(e) broadly.  That is, federal appellate judges have 
consistently held that § 546(e) prevents a Trustee from avoiding these 
payments.
80
 The disagreement among courts in determining whether the 
transfer of funds in the context of an LBO is considered a ‘settlement 
payment’81 is obviously not random.  Where some judges consistently 
interpret the same statute in one way and other judges consistently 
interpret the same statute in an opposite way, all the while using the same 
canons of statutory interpretation, there is a need for explanation. 
 
A.   The Study 
 
Given the radically different treatment of § 546(e) by bankruptcy 
judges and federal appellate judges, I conducted an empirical study to 
determine the extent of this trend based on the court opinions within each 
federal circuit.  My goal was first to describe this trend and then to 
explain why these judges have adopted such radically different positions 
on this issue.  I analyzed the judicial decisions construing § 546(e) 
between 1985 and 2013,
82
 although not necessarily in the context of 
 
77. See infra Appendix I.  17/27 (63%) autonomous bankruptcy court decisions 
held § 546(e) does NOT apply. 
78. 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990). 
79. See infra Appendix I.  12/14 (86%) appellate court decisions held § 546(e) 
applies. 
80. “The Second Circuit recently reiterated that it follows the Third, Sixth, and 
Eighth Circuits, in holding that any transfer to a financial institution may qualify for 
protection, even if it is only serving as a conduit or intermediary.”  In re Tougher Indus., 
Inc., Nos. 06-12960. 07-10022, 2013 WL 5592902, at *5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 
2013) (footnote omitted). 
81. Fox, supra note 58, at 574 (“[T]he only common point in all circuits is that a 
trustee cannot recover from the market intermediaries.”). 
82. “In the 1980's, easy credit and the availability of junk bond financing created a 
frenzy of leveraged buyouts . . . .” William C. Rand, Comment, In re Kaiser Steel 
Corporation: Does Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code Apply to a Fraudulent 
Conveyance Made in the Form of an LBO Payment?, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 87, 87 
(1991).  For statistics on mergers and acquisitions from 1980-88, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990 534 tbl.883 (1990), 
available at  http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1990-05.pdf. 
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leveraged buyouts.
83
  I will explain the reasons for the differing 
interpretations in Parts VI and VII, infra. 
 
B.   Methodology 
 
For purposes of this study, I determined that § 546(e) addresses 
three types of transfers: 1) “a transfer that is a margin payment”; 2) a 
transfer that is a “settlement payment, . . .  made by or to (or for the 
benefit of) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, 
financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency”; 
and 3) “a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a commodity 
broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, 
financial participant, or securities clearing agency in connection with a 
securities contract, . . . a commodity contract, . . .  or forward contract.”84  
My study focused on a subset of the second type of transfer: a transfer 
that is a “settlement payment made by or to (or for the benefit of) a 
financial institution.”85  I excluded those decisions involving the first and 
third types of transfers referenced above. 
I conducted this study by generating a search for all cases 
construing the § 546(e) ‘settlement payment exception.’86  In order to 
ensure meaningful results, I analyzed only those decisions that dealt with 
the merits of fraudulent conveyance actions and the application of § 
546(e) in cases in which there was a controversy as to whether the 
transfer in question was a ‘settlement payment’ made by or to a 
‘financial institution.’  Therefore, I excluded decisions involving 
procedural matters and decisions in connection with procedural phases 
such as motions to dismiss and reviews of summary judgment.  Finally, I 
excluded those decisions involving any transfers made by or to an 
enterprise that would more obviously be considered a financial 
institution within the securities industry, including banks, brokerage 
 
83. The genesis of the study was inspired by the divergence of interpretation 
regarding the application of § 546(e) to protect the payments made to shareholders in the 
context of a leveraged buyout.  From this analysis, a more prominent trend emerged, 
thereby inspiring a more generalized study.  However, the resulting explanation of the 
data is equally applicable in the leveraged buyout context. 
84. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012). 
85. Id. 
86. I generated a search on the legal search engines, Westlaw Next and LexisNexis, 
using the search terms: “11 U.S.C. 546(e),” “section 546(e),” and “settlement payment 
exception” within all state and federal courts. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/8
  
1284 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  34:3 
 
firms and clearing agencies governed by SIPA
87
 regulations.
 88
 
This methodology provided a sample size of fourteen appellate 
court decisions and thirty-eight bankruptcy court decisions.  However, of 
the thirty-eight bankruptcy court decisions, I excluded eleven non-
autonomous decisions.  The exclusion of these decisions was guided by 
the principle that bankruptcy courts are legally bound by both district and 
federal appellate court decisions within the same circuit that are factually 
on point.  Therefore, I use “autonomous” to describe an opinion issued 
by a bankruptcy judge where the judge was not bound by precedent. This 
was determined by classifying the holdings into two groups.  The first 
group of autonomous bankruptcy court decisions includes cases of first 
impression because no prior appellate court decisions had been rendered 
within the circuit.  The second group is comprised of those cases in 
which the bankruptcy judge held he or she was not bound by the 
precedent set by the district and federal appellate courts within that 
circuit.  Analysis of both groups suggests that twenty-seven of the 
bankruptcy court decisions are autonomous.
89
  The eleven non-
autonomous decisions were those decisions issued by bankruptcy judges 
in which the judge was, willingly or unwillingly,
90
 bound by precedent.
91
  
Although bankruptcy judges have issued the decisions, the decisions are 
not pertinent because they merely reiterate the binding rationale of their 
federal appellate court.  I excluded these decisions from my analysis 
because they do not contribute meaningfully to the data regarding the 
interpretational split. 
The purpose for refining the data is evidenced by the results in the 
Third Circuit, for example.
92
  After In re Resorts International, Inc.
93
 
 
87. Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78lll (2012). 
88. The term ‘financial institution’ is extremely open-ended.  See supra Part IV.  
Therefore, such exclusion was admittedly a more subjective aspect of the study. 
89. See infra Appendix I. 
90. One could argue that what looks like a non-autonomous decision is actually an 
autonomous decision because the bankruptcy judge has chosen to be bound by precedent.  
This would suggest that all decisions are in fact autonomous and precedent is 
meaningless, particularly where distinguishing facts is subject to judicial discretion.  See, 
e.g., Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 660 (1931) (discussing, 
hypothetically, how two judges may understand what the objective facts are).  This would 
fall in line with the radical indeterminist theory.  See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Pragmatic 
Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 148 (1990).  I, however, am not willing to say that 
precedent is meaningless here. 
91. See infra Appendix I. 
92. See infra Appendix I, Third Circuit. 
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was decided in 1999, the subsequent bankruptcy court decisions in that 
circuit, which could not sufficiently distinguish the facts, were bound by 
the decision
94
 and held that § 546(e) applied to protect payments made to 
shareholders.  The general trend in the Third Circuit following In re 
Resorts International, Inc. highlights the purpose in designating certain 
decisions as non-autonomous; this demonstrates that the bankruptcy 
judges are not always able to render a decision based on their own 
interpretation of the scope of § 546(e). 
 
C.  The Results 
 
The raw data are rather revealing.  The explanatory percentages are 
based on a total of fourteen appellate court decisions and twenty-seven 
autonomous bankruptcy court decisions. Twelve of the fourteen, or 
eighty-six percent of, appellate judges held that § 546(e) exempted the 
debtor’s transfers from avoidance, holding that these transfers constituted 
settlement payments.
95
  By comparison, ten of the twenty-seven, a mere 
thirty-seven percent of, bankruptcy judges autonomously exempted these 
transfers from avoidance, holding that these transfers constituted 
settlement payments.
96
  Thus, the disagreement among courts in 
determining whether the transfer of funds in the context of an LBO is 
considered a ‘settlement payment’ made by (or to) a ‘financial 
institution’ is obviously not random.  One must ask the glaring question 
that remains, however: why is there a disagreement at all?  I will provide 
several rational explanations in Parts VI and VII, infra. 
 
VI.   Does Legal Formalism Explain the Data? 
 
In our common law tradition, when the same issue of law is posed 
to two different courts, the result should be the same in the absence of 
glaring error; “[a] single answer in most, if not all, cases can be deduced 
 
93. 181 F.3d 505 (3d Cir. 1999). 
94. This is the principle of stare decisis.  20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 129 (2013); see 
infra Appendix I (listing the Third Circuit cases decided after In re Resorts International, 
Inc.). 
95. See infra Appendix I.  Twelve of the fourteen appellate decisions held that § 
546(e) applied. 
96. See infra Appendix I.  Ten of the twenty-seven autonomous bankruptcy 
decisions held that § 546(e) applied. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/8
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by judges who are able to restrict themselves to the rules and to avoid 
making any moral or public policy decisions in rendering judgments.”97  
Therefore, it is significant when bankruptcy judges consistently interpret 
§ 546(e) narrowly and federal appellate judges consistently interpret § 
546(e) broadly. 
Legal formalism “asserts that legal disputes are resolvable solely by 
recourse to legal rules and principles, and to the facts of each particular 
dispute.”98  Where judges are engaged in interpreting the same statute 
and have received the same formal training in the same analytical 
methods, it becomes clear that the ‘facts of each particular dispute’ must 
serve as the justification for this departure.  Judges are bound only if a 
case presents the same legally relevant facts as the precedent, but of 
course, there is no meta-rule that informs a judge of what facts are 
legally relevant.  As a result, almost every case can be distinguished.  
The question is why judges will distinguish particular cases at all.  There 
are several possible explanations for this.  The difference between the 
treatment of fraudulent transfers and the application of § 546(e) is a 
product of a number of variables which, operating in combination, 
explain the divergence.  Under the pretense of legal formalism, judges 
cite the legal arguments of plain meaning and congressional intent as 
justification for the holdings.
99
  However, the inconsistent application of 
the canons of interpretation suggests that something else is driving these 
decisions; legal formalism does not explain the outcomes. 
 
A.   Plain Meaning: It Says What It Says 
 
Bankruptcy judges hold that the plain meaning of § 546(e) does not 
necessarily exempt private stock transactions—including payments to 
selling shareholders—from avoidance as constructive fraudulent 
 
97. Michael P. Ambrosio, Legal Realism, NEW JERSEY LAW., Oct. 2000, at 30.  See 
generally Edward Rubin, The Real Formalists, the Real Realists, and What They Tell Us 
About Judicial Decision Making and Legal Education, 109 MICH. L. REV. 863 (2011) 
(reviewing BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010)). 
98. Ambrosio, supra note 97, at 30. 
99. See Schilling, supra note 24, at 484; see also Fox, supra note 58, at 573 (“The 
application of the settlement payment exception is problematic because of the 
contradiction between the broad literal wording of the exception and its narrow 
legislative purpose.  The language of the statute is quite expansive and arguably exempts 
all stock transactions from avoidance, while the legislative history indicates that the 
statute meant to protect only the market for publicly traded stock.”). 
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transfers.
100
  As applied to an LBO, “the key language in § 546(e) is that 
the [T]rustee may not avoid a transfer that is a ‘settlement payment’ 
made ‘by or to’ a ‘financial institution.’”101  The textual support for 
bankruptcy judges’ refusal to apply the settlement payment exception to 
this type of private stock transfer is based on their interpretation of the 
plain meaning of the statute—the “belief that the Bankruptcy Code’s 
definition of ‘settlement payment’ is limited by the phrase ‘or any other 
similar payment commonly used in securities trade’ that appears at the 
end of Bankruptcy Code section 741(8).”102  Bankruptcy judges hold that 
the contemporaneous payments made to selling shareholders during the 
effectuation of the LBO are not payments commonly used in the 
securities trade, and thus, that § 546(e) does not protect the transfers to 
shareholders from being voided as fraudulent transfers; to hold as such 
“would . . . deprive the [statutory] definition of meaning.”103  
Additionally, § 101(22) of the Bankruptcy Code defines ‘financial 
institution’ entities as, inter alia, including all commercial and savings 
banks, savings and loan associations, and federally insured credit 
unions.
104
 Aside from being broad, and far from plain, this language 
provides for the “mere conduit” argument, encouraging the running of 
money through ‘financial institutions’ as a mere means of protecting 
these payments to shareholders, which are not commonly used in the 
securities trade, from avoidance.
105
 
On the other hand, federal appellate judges, applying the same 
canons of statutory interpretation,
106
 hold that § 546(e) has a different 
 
100. See In re MacMenamin's Grill Ltd., 450 B.R. 414, 419 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(collecting cases); In re Grand Eagle Companies, Inc., 288 B.R. 484, 495 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2003) (“[Target] will not be permitted to merely cite to that technically drafted 
statutory protection mechanism to summarily defeat the Committee's claims.”). 
101. Schilling, supra note 24, at 490 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012)). 
102. In re MacMenamin’s, 450 B.R. at 421 (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 
546(e)); see also 11 U.S.C. § 741(8). 
103. In re Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc., 367 B.R. 68, 76 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
104. 11 U.S.C. § 101(22). 
105. See, e.g., In re Munford, Inc., 98 F.3d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1996) (“But the 
bank here was nothing more than an intermediary or conduit.  Funds were deposited with 
the bank and when the bank received the shares from the selling shareholders, it sent 
funds to them in exchange.  The bank never acquired a beneficial interest in either the 
funds or the shares.”). 
106. See Lamie v. U. S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“It is well established 
that ‘when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where 
the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’” 
(quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/8
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plain meaning than the plain meaning described by the bankruptcy 
judges.
107
  This plain meaning protects all parties to the transaction at the 
expense of unsecured creditors because payments to shareholders within 
the context of an LBO are ‘commonly used in the securities trade.’108  In 
addition, most federal appellate judges oppose the “mere conduit” 
argument articulated by the bankruptcy courts.
109
  These judges hold that 
the language of § 546(e) contains no requirement that a financial 
institution acquire a beneficial interest in the funds it handles.
110
  This 
plain meaning permits the parties to run money through ‘financial 
institutions’ to prevent the possibility of avoidance if they so choose. 
Where the “term ‘plain meaning’ implies that something is apparent 
on its face and incapable of reasonable disagreement,”111 it becomes 
clear that the plain meaning of § 546(e) is less than plain and that other 
factors contribute to this divided interpretation. 
 
B.   Congressional Intent: But What Does It Mean? 
 
Where a statute has no plain meaning, or yields absurd results, 
judges turn to Congressional intent to give meaning to the statutory 
language.
112
  The legislative history of § 546(e) suggests that Congress 
enacted the statute in 1982 to “minimize the displacement caused in the 
 
(2000))). 
107. See, e.g., Contemporary Industries Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 
2009) (“[T]he relevant text has a sufficiently plain and unambiguous meaning.  We agree 
with our sister circuits that § 741(8) was intended to sweep broadly.  Thus, we conclude 
the term ‘settlement payment,’ as used therein, encompasses most transfers of money or 
securities made to complete a securities transaction.” (citations omitted)). 
108. See In re QSI Holdings, Inc., 571 F.3d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[N]othing in 
the statutory language indicates that Congress sought to limit that protection to publicly 
traded securities.”). 
109. Compare In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc., 480 B.R. 468, 476-77 (2012) (“At 
least three courts of appeals, however, have expressly rejected Munford, holding that ‘the 
plain language of § 546(e) simply does not require a ‘financial institution’ to have a 
‘beneficial interest’ in the transferred funds.’”) (collecting cases), with In re Munford, 
Inc., 98 F.3d at 610 (applying the “mere conduit” argument). 
110. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012). 
111. Schilling, supra note 24, at 516. 
112. “[W]here the plain language, even if literally applicable, would yield absurd 
results at odds with the statutory design, courts may look beyond the printed word to the 
law as a whole and its purposes and policy, so as to determine what particular legislative 
intent may apply.”  In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp., 263 B.R. 406, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (citing Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989)). 
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commodities and securities markets in the event of a major bankruptcy 
affecting those industries.”113  The rationale behind preventing the 
avoidance power of a Trustee by means of the settlement payment 
exception “was to prevent the bankruptcy of one party in the 
commodities clearance and settlement [system] from spreading to other 
parties,” thereby threatening the collapse of the entire market.114  
However, “[a]t the time of the 1981 Subcommittee Hearings, leveraged 
buyouts were . . . obscure and occurred infrequently;”115 the 
repercussions of preventing the avoidance powers of a Trustee in the 
context of an LBO were not yet considered.  Therefore, there is little 
statutory guidance on the application of § 546(e) to prevent avoidance of 
payments to shareholders in the context of an LBO.
116
 
Where bankruptcy judges hold that § 546(e) is not plain in meaning, 
they view the legislative history of § 546(e) as highly relevant to the 
statute’s application in the context of private stock transaction,117 noting 
that “[w]here a securities transaction is entirely private, such as in an 
LBO of a privately held company . . . it is difficult to see how the 
purpose of protecting the national clearance and settlement system has 
any relationship to that LBO.”118  Bankruptcy court opinions typically 
reflect the notion that the settlement payment exception, as applied to 
LBOs, serves no purpose in preventing “the domino effect”119 within the 
commodities and securities markets. 
In the absence of plain meaning, federal appellate judges also turn 
to congressional intent.  In doing so, these judges hold “that the broad 
definition of settlement payment further[s] a policy of protecting 
 
113. H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583. 
114. Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 61-62. 
115. Parikh, supra note 9, at 337. 
116. See id. at 332 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-420). 
117. See, e.g., Buckley v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. Civ.A.02-CV-11497RGS, 
2005 WL 1206865, at *7 (D. Mass. May 20, 2005) (“The object that Congress sought to 
accomplish by enacting § 546(e) was to protect the operation of the security industry's 
clearance and settlement system.  That interest is not furthered in any meaningful sense 
by bringing an LBO like the one at issue in this case under the exemption of § 546(e) 
simply because funds fortuitously passed through financial institutions on their way into 
the hands of the defendants.”); see also In re MacMenamin's Grill Ltd., 450 B.R. 414, 
419-20 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc., 367 B.R. 68, 76 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007) (interpreting H.R. REP. NO. 97–420). 
118. Schilling, supra note 24, at 492. 
119. Bankruptcy of Commodity and Securities Brokers: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th 
Cong. 203 (1981) (statement of Edmund Schroeder); see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1. 
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securities markets from harm that might occur if bankruptcy [T]rustees 
have the power to unwind settled securities transactions;”120 that 
“interpreting ‘settlement payment’ to include the transfer of 
consideration in an LBO is consistent with the way ‘settlement’ is 
defined in the securities industry . . . [as] ‘the completion of a securities 
transaction.’”121  In addition, the federal appellate judges disagree with 
the interpretation put forth by the bankruptcy judges based on the 
supposition that “Congress could have addressed the breadth of § 546(e) 
and the definition of settlement payment, but it has not done so.”122 
Where “[i]t remains ambiguous what exactly the settlement 
payment exception [must] shield in order to protect the markets,”123 it is 
clear that plain meaning and congressional intent are not determinative.  
There must be something else that perpetuates the divide between 
bankruptcy and federal appellate judges.  Legal formalism does not 
explain the data. 
 
 
VII.   So, What Does Explain the Data? Articulating the Unarticulated 
 
Where judges are to reason deductively from the same formal 
rules—plain meaning and congressional intent—and consider the same 
set of facts, legal formalism suggests that the outcomes should be the 
same.  Yet, although judges say, by means of written legal opinion, that 
they are merely interpreting the statute,
124
 the difference of 
interpretations is remarkable.  Where bankruptcy judges have adopted a 
pragmatic analysis, federal appellate judges instead have adopted a 
purely textual analysis.  The question then becomes, why?  I see three 
possible explanations for this divide: the specialization of the bankruptcy 
courts, the recognition that bankruptcy courts are acting as courts of 
equity, and the attitudinal differences towards judicial regulation of the 
 
120. Schilling, supra note 24, at 488. 
121. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 846, 849 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (quoting A. PESSIN & J. ROSS, WORDS OF WALL STREET: 2000 INVESTMENT 
TERMS DEFINED 227 (1983)). 
122. Schilling, supra note 24, at 488 (citing In re Quality Stores, Inc., 355 B.R. 
629, 634 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006)). 
123. Fox, supra note 58, at 587. 
124. See Frank, supra note 90, at 653 (“Opinions . . . disclose but little of how 
judges come to their conclusions.  The opinions are often ex post facto; they are censored 
expositions.”). 
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private market. 
 
A.   Impact of Specialization on Bankruptcy Court Decisions 
 
One argument is that court specialization has had an impact on the 
judiciary system.  Prior to 1898, “[f]ederal bankruptcy legislation was 
used as a temporary and emergency measure, appropriate only to deal 
with the aftermath of economic downturn.”125  However, the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978
126
 established the bankruptcy courts as specialized 
courts.
127
  As specialized courts, bankruptcy courts have since developed 
considerable experience with regard to bankruptcy matters and as a 
result, tend to view cases pragmatically.  This approach makes sense 
where bankruptcy judges hear only bankruptcy cases—100% of their 
caseload involves bankruptcy cases.  In contrast, out of the 44,440 cases 
pending in the federal appellate courts as of March 21, 2011, only 610 of 
these cases involved bankruptcy matters.
128
  This number of bankruptcy 
cases represents roughly one percent of the total caseload, divided among 
various judges.  Bankruptcy judges may be better equipped to understand 
the implications of using § 546(e) to protect payments to shareholders as 
a result of their wealth of experience
129: “[s]pecialist judges can be, and 
often are, recruited from the ranks of lawyers who have practiced in that 
area, so they often come to the bench with relevant expertise.”130  
 
125. JEFFREY T. FERRIELL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 
112 (3rd ed. 2012). 
126. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2549, 
2682 (1978). 
127. “Specialized courts usually are defined as forums of highly limited jurisdiction 
to which all of the cases of a particular type are channeled.”  Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, 
Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995).  Bankruptcy courts typically fall within this category. See 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 
1228 (2006). 
128. See Table B-1: U.S. Courts of Appeals—Appeals Commenced, Terminated, 
and Pending, by Circuit, During the 12 Month Period Ending March 31, 2011, U. S. 
COURTS.GOV, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadS
tatistics/2011/tables/B01Mar11.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2014). 
129. See Fox, supra note 58, at 572 (“Stripping the bankruptcy trustee or debtor of 
avoidance powers for payments to shareholders in connection with an LBO potentially 
encourages poorly planned LBOs and may facilitate funneling cash away from failing 
companies to the detriment of the creditors.” (footnote omitted)). 
130. Rachlinski et al., supra note 127, at 1229. 
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Bankruptcy judges issuing decisions interpreting § 546(e) had been 
practicing within the bankruptcy field for an average of about twenty-
nine years prior to deciding the case at hand.
131
  On the other hand, 
federal appellate judges had spent an average of 0.75 years exclusively 
practicing in the bankruptcy field prior to issuing a decision in regard to 
§ 546(e).
132
  This “reflects only the practical reality that district court 
[and appellate court] judges are usually not much interested in 
bankruptcy and are overwhelmed with other litigation.”133  Although 
there is some criticism of court specialization,
134
 “[t]he romantic view of 
the generalist federal judge, however, is not without its costs.  Obsession 
with the generalist deprives the federal judiciary of potential expertise, 
which could be extremely useful in cases involving complex doctrines 
and specialized knowledge,”135 particularly in cases construing § 546(e). 
 
B.   Bankruptcy Courts as Courts of Equity 
 
The disparity of interpretation reflects the notion that bankruptcy 
judges typically view the transactions in terms of equity,
136
 whereas the 
federal appellate judges view the transactions in terms of law.  This may 
be particularly true where “[t]he function of bankruptcy courts is to 
implement the social policy set forth in bankruptcy law.”137  This is 
 
131. See infra Appendix II. 
132. See infra Appendix III. 
133. FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 125, at 130; see Stephen Lubben, The Need 
for More Bankruptcy Knowledge on the Circuit Courts, CREDIT SLIPS (March 30, 2010, 
12:16 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2010/03/the-need-for-more-
bankruptcy-knowledge-on-the-circuit-courts.html. 
134. Rachlinski et al., supra note 127, at 1230 (“Here, we report evidence showing 
that bankruptcy judges are vulnerable to anchoring and framing effects . . . .”). 
135. Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 
524 (2008). 
136. “The Supreme Court has recognized for many years that bankruptcy courts 
‘are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings [are] inherently proceedings in 
equity.’”  KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 223 (2008) 
(alteration in original).  However, there exists a strong debate surrounding origins of 
bankruptcy courts as courts of equity.  See, e.g., Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy 
Court Is A Court of Equity”: What Does That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 275-76 
(1999).  Much of this argument centers on Bankruptcy Code § 105(a), which allows a 
bankruptcy court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”  Id. at 307 n.208 (quoting 11 U.S.C. 
§105(a) (2012)). 
137. Krieger, supra note 136, at 276. 
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demonstrated by the fact that, “whether by liquidation or reorganization, 
[bankruptcy law] serves admittedly equitable objectives.”138  To 
understand this explanation, one must first consider how this emphasis 
on equity in the bankruptcy courts came to be. 
“Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution and the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, as amended, confer and delegate, respectively, 
equitable authority to federal district judges . . . .”139  Under the 
Bankruptcy Acts of 1867 and 1898, district courts were defined as 
“courts of bankruptcy,” and were given original jurisdiction in all matters 
and proceedings in bankruptcy.
140
 Congress later repealed the Act of 
1898 and replaced it with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
141
 thereby 
revoking the bankruptcy court’s explicit powers as a court of equity.142  
Although not truly a court of equity, it is still true that “[b]ankruptcy 
laws, by their nature, embody a compromise between fundamental, 
competing social and economic objectives.”143 
There is a similar argument that bankruptcy courts are involved in 
the practice of legal realism. “[Legal] [r]ealists s[eek] the moral 
dimension in law, not in rules and principles or the higher law appraisals 
of rules and principles, but in the process of responsible decision.”144  
This legal theory underlies the pragmatic approach of the bankruptcy 
judges, particularly where “legal realists consider[] . . . solutions to 
practical social problems[] . . . [and maintain] a common sense approach 
to legal analysis.”145 
Whether labeled equity or legal realism, it is clear that 
considerations of fairness and the potential for abuse typically trouble 
bankruptcy judges; these opinions often articulate that § 546(e) permits 
“a nominal number of shareholders to receive windfall profits at the 
expense of employee pension plans, retirement plans, mutual funds, and 
 
138. Id. 
139. Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of A Bankruptcy Judge: 
A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 12 (2005) 
(emphasis added) (construing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). 
140. See id. at 16-19. 
141. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 
2682 (1978). 
142. Ahart, supra note 139, at 22. 
143. Krieger, supra note 136, at 276. 
144. Ambrosio, supra note 97, at 34. 
145. Id. 
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other entities that manage funds belonging to millions of individuals.”146  
Furthermore, the majority of unsecured creditors cannot realistically 
protect themselves; instead, “powerful creditors will protect themselves 
while less advantageously situated creditors have no comparable means 
of protection.”147 
The notion of bankruptcy courts as courts of equity is further 
reflected in an equitable doctrine, known as the ‘collapsing doctrine,’ 
developed in the context of LBOs and unique to the bankruptcy courts.  
Where a focus of fraudulent transfer analysis is whether the transaction 
involved sufficient consideration, as required under § 548 or state law 
through § 544, a threshold inquiry in certain fraudulent transfer actions is 
whether the particular transactions sought to be avoided can be 
considered in isolation or should be considered as part of an integrated 
transaction.
148
  The collapsing doctrine has been applied where many 
variations on the classic LBO have been structured in order to sidestep 
the fraudulent transfer analysis of the archetypical form,
149
 allowing 
courts to avoid creative circumvention of the law.
150
  The essence of this 
doctrine is that despite the structural variations in the LBO, the 
underlying transaction remains substantively the same.
151
  Despite the 
strategic manipulation of the transactions within the LBO, “once the 
LBO transactions are collapsed, sufficient consideration is unlikely to be 
found unless concrete indirect benefits accrue for the target 
corporation.”152  This result provides the potential for significant 
 
146. Parikh, supra note 9, at 310-11. 
147. Liss, supra note 40, at 1512. 
148. In recent years, courts have increasingly looked to the “the overall effect of the 
LBO on the target corporation . . . rather than the effect of each discrete transaction.”  
Blackwood, supra note 8, at 362. 
149. See Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 57 (“A properly structured LBO might be 
arranged, however, so that the individual steps of the buyout, when viewed as discrete 
transactions, may not be constructively fraudulent as to creditors.”).  These variations in 
structure will not be discussed in this Note.  For further discussion, see Carlson, supra 
note 6, at 81-83. 
150. See, e.g., Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 503 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1988) (“[T]he formal structure of the transaction alone cannot shield the LBO 
lenders or the controlling . . . shareholders from Wieboldt's fraudulent conveyance 
claims.”).  The focus is on the net effect to honest creditors.  See id. 
151. The Supreme Court has held that “a bankruptcy court, as a court of equity, 
may look through form to substance when determining the true nature of a transaction as 
it relates to the rights of parties against a bankrupt’s estate.”  KLEE, supra note 136, at 
224 (discussing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939)). 
152. Blackwood, supra note 8, at 362. 
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recovery to creditors, who would otherwise have no remedy.  However, 
the collapsing doctrine has no true legal basis in the Bankruptcy Code.
153
  
The collapsing doctrine reflects the same set of ideas that underlie the 
bankruptcy judges’ restricted application of § 546(e), including the 
protection of small, unsophisticated creditors. 
Where sentiments of equity are pertinent, it is evident that 
bankruptcy judges are responding to equity-based variables rather than 
purely legal rules and principles.  There is much criticism that the 
characterization of bankruptcy court as courts of equity is no longer 
appropriate, particularly where bankruptcy courts apply a statutory 
scheme rather than equitable maxims and do not operate in the same 
fashion as true courts of equity once did.
154
  As a result, federal appellate 
courts may, in fact, be attempting to remedy this trend,
155
 justifying the 
application of § 546(e) and thereby exempting payments made to selling 
shareholders from avoidance by distinguishing results that may seem 
‘unfair’ from those that are ‘unjust.’156  This trend among the federal 
appellate courts demonstrates an attempt to curb the bankruptcy courts’ 
ability to take equitable action in situations where the Bankruptcy Code 
(supposedly) expresses some limited intent.
157
 
 
C.   The Self-Regulating Market 
 
Another explanation for the different treatment of § 546(e) between 
bankruptcy judges and federal appellate judges is that the latter are pro-
private market.  There are two positions regarding the use of fraudulent 
transfer law to regulate LBOs.  One position suggests that fraudulent 
 
153. The collapsing doctrine may be justified by Bankruptcy Code § 105(a), which 
allows a bankruptcy court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”  11 U.S.C. §105(a) (2012).  However, 
“[a]lthough the bankruptcy court has broad equitable power to issue orders in aid of its 
jurisdiction, the [Supreme] Court has limited this power when the relief granted is 
inconsistent with provisions of the . . . Bankruptcy Code.”  KLEE, supra note 136, at 229. 
154. See Krieger, supra note 136, at 310. 
155. When a “case is appealed, the upper court usually devotes its opinions to an 
approval or criticism of the formal-law language which was intoned by the lower court 
judge.”  Frank, supra note 90, at 663. 
156. See In re Quality Stores, Inc., 355 B.R. 629, 635 n.5 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
2006); see also Schilling, supra note 24, at 488. 
157. “[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can 
only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.”  Norwest Bank 
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988). 
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transfer law need not apply in the context of an LBO because the market 
itself is regulation enough; the parties can protect themselves.
158
  Some 
courts go so far as to suggest that if fraudulent conveyance laws are 
applied to LBOs indiscriminately, this acquisition method may be 
judicially discouraged.
159
  Although federal appellate court judges have 
not spoken expressly about why they choose not to apply fraudulent 
transfer law, the fact that the LBOs are left unregulated implicitly 
supports the argument that these judges do not believe that regulation is 
necessary.  On the other hand, bankruptcy decisions have outcomes 
consistent with the theory that the market is not sufficiently protecting 
unsecured creditors; bankruptcy judges do not trust the market. 
The data clearly indicate that bankruptcy judges have adopted a 
pragmatic analysis of § 546(e) while federal appellate judges instead 
have adopted a purely textual analysis.  This remarkable difference of 
interpretation demonstrates a clear departure from legal formalism.  As I 
have demonstrated, these decisions are guided instead by the 
specialization of the bankruptcy courts, the recognition that bankruptcy 
courts are acting as courts of equity, and the attitudinal differences 
towards judicial regulation of the private market. 
 
VIII.   Conclusion 
 
“In enacting and amending section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, 
Congress has stated on numerous occasions that its purpose is to protect 
financial markets from the systemic risk posed by a bankruptcy [T]rustee 
asserting avoidance claims to unwind certain transactions that might 
 
158. Baird and Jackson argue that creditors can protect themselves from the risk of 
the debtor’s insolvency, “based on a conception of fraudulent conveyance law as a 
species of contract law.”  Liss, supra note 40, at 1511 (discussing Douglas G. Baird & 
Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. 
REV. 829, 835-36 (1985)).  This argument suggests that unsecured creditors are wholly 
capable of obtaining a perfected security interest, a letter of credit from the bank, or 
charging a fee for assuming the risk.  See id. at 1512 (“A security interest gives the 
creditor the right to declare default and proceed directly against the collateral without 
resorting to judicial process, and assets can be appropriated to the full extent of the 
claim.”). 
159. See, e.g., In re Morse Tool, Inc. 108 B.R. 389 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); see 
also Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 9, at 137 (“[T]oo broad an application of 
fraudulent transfer law to these transactions would discourage useful business 
ventures.”). 
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impact the markets.”160  However, as I have demonstrated, bankruptcy 
judges and federal appellate judges disagree fundamentally as to whether 
§ 546(e) is limited to transactions involving financial markets.  While 
bankruptcy judges typically interpret § 546(e) narrowly in order to 
prevent the apparent injustice of paying shareholders before bona fide 
creditors, reviewing federal appellate judges consistently interpret § 
546(e) broadly, thereby shielding all stock transactions from avoidance.  
Although both courts use formal legal reasoning as a vehicle to explain 
the outcomes, the divided interpretation suggests that the decisions are 
justified not merely on the language of the legislation, but rather, are 
influenced by the specialization of the bankruptcy courts, the recognition 
that bankruptcy courts are acting as courts of equity, and the attitudinal 
differences towards judicial regulation of the private market.  Legal 
formalism does not provide an explanation for the different outcomes. 
 
 
160. Merrett & Chase, supra note 46. 
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§ 546(e) Does Not Apply to Protect Share-
holders 
 § 546(e) Applies to Protect Shareholders 
Bankruptcy District Appellate  Bankruptcy District Appellate 
First Circuit    First Circuit   
In re Healthco 
Int’l, Inc., 195 
B.R. 971 
(Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1996) 
Autonomous 
Zahn v. Yu-
caipa Capital 
Fund, 218 
B.R. 656 
(D.R.I. 1998) 
     
Second Circuit    Second Cir-
cuit 
  
In re Enron 
Corp., 328 
B.R. 58 
(Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
Autonomous 
      
In re Enron 
Corp., 323 
B.R. 857 
(Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
Autonomous  
      
In re Enron 
Corp., 341 
B.R. 451 
(Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
Autonomous 
      
In re Norstan 
Apparel Shops, 
Inc., 367 B.R. 
68 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 
2007) 
Autonomous 
      
In re Manhat-
tan Inv. Fund 
Ltd., 359 B.R. 
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510 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 
2007), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in 
part, 397 B.R. 
1 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) 
Autonomous 
In re Enron 
Creditors Re-
covery Corp., 
407 B.R. 17 
(Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 
2009), rev’d, 
422 B.R. 423 
(S.D.N.Y. 
2009) 
Autonomous 
      
     In re Enron 
Creditors 
Recovery 
Corp., 422 
B.R. 423 
(S.D.N.Y. 
2009) 
 
In re Mac-
Menamin’s 
Grill Ltd., 450 
B.R. 414 
(Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
Autonomous  
      
      In  re Enron 
Creditors Re-
covery Corp., 
651 F.3d 329 
(2d Cir. 2011) 
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     In re Que-
becor 
World 
(USA) Inc., 
480 B.R. 
468 
(S.D.N.Y. 
2012) 
 
     AP Servs. 
LLP v. Sil-
va, 483 
B.R. 63 
(S.D.N.Y. 
2012) 
 
 
     In re Trib-
une Co. 
Fraudulent 
Conveyance 
Litig., 499 
B.R. 310 
(S.D.N.Y. 
2013) 
 
    In re Tougher 
Indus., Inc., 
2013 WL 
5592902 
(Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 
2013) 
Not Autono-
mous 
  
Third Circuit    Third Circuit   
      In re Resorts 
Int’l, Inc., 181 
F.3d 505 (3d 
Cir. 1999) 
     In re Fin. 
Mgmt. Scis., 
Inc., 261 B.R. 
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150 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 
2001) 
Not Autono-
mous 
     In re 
Hechinger 
Inv. Co. of 
Del., 274 
B.R. 71 (D. 
Del. 2002) 
 
In re OODC, 
LLC, 321 B.R. 
128 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2005) 
Autonomous 
   In re Lorang-
er Mfg. Corp., 
324 B.R. 575 
(Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 2005) 
Not Autono-
mous 
  
     In re Nat’l 
Forge Co., 
344 B.R. 
340 (W.D. 
Pa. 2006) 
 
    In re Borden 
Chems. & 
Plastics Oper-
ating Ltd. 
P’ship, 336 
B.R. 214 
(Bankr. D. 
Del. 2006) 
Not Autono-
mous 
  
    In re The IT 
Group, Inc., 
359 B.R. 97 
(Bankr. D. 
Del. 2006) 
Not Autono-
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mous 
    In re Plassein 
Int’l Corp., 
366 B.R. 318 
(Bankr. D. 
Del. 2007) 
Not Autono-
mous 
  
     In re Plas-
sein Int’l 
Corp., 388 
B.R. 46 (D. 
Del. 2008)  
 
    In re Elrod 
Holdings 
Corp., 394 
B.R. 760 
(Bankr. D. 
Del. 2008) 
Not Autono-
mous 
  
 
 
     In re Plassein 
Int’l Corp., 
590 F.3d 252  
(3d Cir. 2009) 
In re Mervyn’s 
Holdings, LLC, 
426 B.R. 488 
(Bankr. D. Del. 
2010) 
Autonomous  
      
  In re Apple-
seed’s Inter-
mediate 
Holdings, 
LLC, 470 
B.R. 289 (D. 
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Del. 2012)  
In re Qimonda 
Richmond, 
LLC, 467 B.R. 
318 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2012) 
Autonomous 
   In re U.S. 
Mortg. Corp., 
491 B.R. 642 
(Bankr. D. 
N.J. 2013) 
Not Autono-
mous 
  
Fourth Circuit    Fourth Circuit   
    In re Blanton, 
105 B.R. 321 
(Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 1989) 
Autonomous 
  
    In re Deriv-
ium Capital, 
LLC, 437 
B.R. 798 
(Bankr. D. 
S.C. 2010) 
Autonomous 
 
 
In re Deriv-
ium Capital 
LLC, 716 
F.3d 355,(4th 
Cir. 2013) 
Fifth Circuit      Fifth Circuit   
  Wider v. 
Wootton, 
907 F.2d 
570 (5th 
Cir. 1990) 
     
 Jewel Recov-
ery, L.P. v. 
Gordon, 196 
B.R. 348 
(N.D. Tex. 
1996) 
     
    In re Olympic 
Natural Gas 
Co., 258 B.R. 
161 (Bankr. 
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S.D. Tex. 
2001) 
Autonomous 
      In re Olympic 
Natural Gas 
Co., 294 F.3d 
737 (5th Cir. 
2002) 
     Lightfoot v. 
MXEnergy, 
Inc.,  2011 
WL 
1899764 
(E.D. La. 
2011) 
 
       In re MBS 
Mgmt. Servs., 
Inc., 690 F.3d 
352 (5th Cir. 
2012) 
 
     U.S. Bank 
Nat’l Ass’n 
v. Verizon 
Comm. 
Inc., 892 F. 
Supp. 2d 
805 (N.D. 
Tex. 2012) 
 
Sixth Circuit    Sixth Circuit   
    In re Grand 
Eagle Com-
panies, Inc., 
288 B.R. 484 
(Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2003) 
Autonomous 
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    In re Quality 
Stores Inc., 
355 B.R. 629 
(Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 2006) 
Autonomous  
  
     QSI Hold-
ings, Inc. v. 
Alford, 382 
B.R. 731 
(W.D. 
Mich. 2007) 
 
      In re QSI 
Holdings, 
Inc., 571 F.3d 
545 (6th Cir. 
2009) 
Seventh Circuit    Seventh Cir-
cuit 
  
 Wieboldt 
Stores, Inc. v. 
Schottenstein, 
131 B.R. 655 
(N.D. Ill. 
1991) 
     
    In re Renew 
Energy LLC, 
463 B.R. 475 
(Bankr. W.D. 
Wis. 2011) 
Autonomous  
  
    In re Lancelot 
Investors 
Fund, L.P., 
467 B.R. 643 
(Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2012) 
Autonomous  
  
Eighth Circuit    Eighth Circuit   
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    In re Con-
temporary 
Indus. Corp., 
2007 WL 
5256918 
(Bankr. D. 
Neb. June 29, 
2007) 
Autonomous  
 
 
 
      Contemporary 
Indus. Corp. 
v. Frost, 564 
F.3d 981 (8th 
Cir. 2009) 
Ninth Circuit    Ninth Circuit   
     In re Comark, 
124 B.R. 806 
(Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 1991) 
Autonomous 
  
    In re Comark, 
145 B.R. 47 
(B.A.P. 9th  
Cir. 1992) 
Autonomous 
  
     
 
 
 
In re Comark, 
971 F.2d 322 
(9th Cir. 
1992) 
 
    In re Hamil-
ton Taft & 
Co., 176 B.R. 
895 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. 
1995) 
Not Autono-
mous 
  
     In re Ham-
ilton Taft  
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& Co., 196 
B.R. 532 
(N.D. Cal. 
1995) 
 
 
     In re Hamil-
ton Taft & 
Co., 114 F.3d 
991 (9th Cir. 
1997) 
In re Grafton 
Partners, L.P., 
321 B.R. 527 
(B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 2005) 
Autonomous 
 
      
Tenth Circuit    Tenth Circuit   
In re Republic 
Fin. Corp., 75 
B.R. 840 
(Bankr. N.D. 
Okla. 1987) 
Autonomous 
      
In re Kaiser 
Steel Corp., 
105 B.R. 639 
(Bankr. D. Co-
lo. 1989), 
rev’d, 110 B.R. 
514 (D. Colo. 
1990) 
Autonomous  
       
      Kaiser Steel 
Corp. v. 
Charles 
Schwab & 
Co., 913 F.2d 
846 (10th Cir. 
1990) 
       In re Kaiser 
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Steel Corp., 
952 F.2d 
1230 (10th 
Cir. 1991) 
  In re Kaiser 
Merger Litig., 
168 B.R. 991 
(D. Colo. 
1994) 
     
In re Integra 
Realty Res., 
Inc., 198 B.R. 
352 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. 1996) 
Autonomous 
      
    In re Yeagley, 
220 B.R. 402 
(Bankr. D. 
Kan. 1998) 
Not Autono-
mous 
  
In re D.E.I. 
Sys., Inc., 2011 
WL 1261603 
(Bankr. D. 
Utah April 5, 
2011) 
Autonomous  
      
Eleventh Cir-
cuit  
   Eleventh Cir-
cuit 
  
In re Int’l Gold 
Bullion Exch., 
Inc., 53 B.R. 
660 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1985) 
Autonomous 
   
 
   
  In re 
Munford, 
Inc., 98 
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F.3d 604 
(11th Cir. 
1996) 
In re Bankest 
Capital Corp., 
374 B.R. 333 
(Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 2007) 
Not Autono-
mous 
      
Total Bank-
ruptcy: 18 
Autonomous: 
17 
Non-
Autonomous: 1 
17/27 (63%) 
autonomous 
bankruptcy 
court deci-
sions held § 
546(e) does 
NOT apply 
Total District: 
5 
Total Ap-
pellate: 2 
2/14 
(14%) 
appellate 
court de-
cisions 
held § 
546(e) 
does NOT 
apply 
 Total Bank-
ruptcy: 20 
Autonomous: 
10 
Non-
Autonomous: 
10 
10/27 (37%) 
autonomous 
bankruptcy 
court deci-
sions held § 
546(e) ap-
plies 
Total Dis-
trict: 11 
Total Appel-
late: 12 
12/14 (86%) 
appellate 
court deci-
sions held § 
546(e) applies  
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Appendix II 
Bankruptcy Judges 
 
§ 546(e) Does NOT Apply to Protect Shareholders 
 
 Bankruptcy Court Judge 
(No. years practicing bankruptcy 
prior to decision)1 
First Circuit   
 In re Healthco Int’l, Inc., 195 
B.R. 971 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1996) 
James F. Queenan, Jr. (1958-1996) 
38 
 
Second Circuit   
 In re Norstan Apparel Shops, 
Inc., 367 B.R. 68 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
Carla E. Craig (1980-1999) 
19 
 In re Enron Corp., 323 B.R. 
857 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)  
Arthur J. Gonzalez (1983-2005) 
22 
 
 In re Enron Corp., 328 B.R. 
58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
Arthur J. Gonzalez (1983-2005) 
22 
 
 In re Enron Corp., 341 B.R. 
451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
Arthur J. Gonzalez (1983-2006) 
23 
 
 In re Enron Creditors 
Recovery Corp., 407 B.R. 17 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
rev’d, 422 B.R. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) 
Arthur J. Gonzalez (1983-2009) 
26 
 In re Manhattan Inv. Fund 
Ltd., 359 B.R. 510 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2007)  
Burton R. Lifland (1954-2007) 
53 
 In re MacMenamin’s Grill 
Ltd., 450 B.R. 414 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
Robert D. Drain (1985-2011) 
16 
Third Circuit   
 
1. Data obtained from Westlaw Next Profiler 
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 In re OODC, LLC, 321 B.R. 
128 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005)  
Mary F. Walrath (1979-2005) 
26 
 In re Mervyn’s Holdings, 
LLC, 426 B.R. 488 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2010) 
Kevin Gross (1977-2010) 
33 
 In re Qimonda Richmond, 
LLC, 467 B.R. 318 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2012) 
Mary F. Walrath (1979-2012) 
33 
Fourth Circuit   
  
 
 
Fifth Circuit   
  
 
 
Seventh Circuit   
  
 
 
Eighth Circuit   
  
 
 
 
Ninth Circuit   
 In re Grafton Partners, L.P., 
321 B.R. 527 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2005) 
Christopher M. Klein (CJ) (1976-
2005) 
29 
 
Tenth Circuit   
 In re D.E.I. Sys., Inc., 2011 
WL 1261603 (Bankr. D. Utah 
April 5, 2011) 
 
R. Kimball Mosier (1980-2011) 
31 
 In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 105 
B.R. 639 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1989), rev’d, 110 B.R. 514 (D. 
Colo. 1990)  
Charles E. Matheson (1961-1989) 
28 
 In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 
198 B.R. 352 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1996)  
Patricia A. Clark (1961-1996) 
35 
 In re Republic Fin. Corp., 75 
B.R. 840 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 
1987)  
Glen E. Clark (1971-1987) 
16 
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Eleventh 
Circuit 
  
 In re Bankest Capital Corp., 
374 B.R. 333 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 2007) 
A. Jay Cristol (1959-2007) 
48 
 In re Int’l Gold Bullion Exch., 
Inc., 53 B.R. 660 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 1985) 
Sidney M. Weaver (1954-1985) 
31 
 Total Bankruptcy: 18 
 
Years Total: 529/18 
Average: 29.38 
The average bankruptcy judge 
practiced bankruptcy for 29.38 
years prior to issuing a decision 
holding that § 546(e) did not apply 
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§ 546(e) Applies to Protect Shareholders 
 
 
 
Bankruptcy Court Judge 
(No. years practicing 
bankruptcy prior to decision)2 
First Circuit   
   
Second Circuit   
 In re Tougher Indus., Inc.,  
2013 WL 5592902 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2013) 
Robert E. Littlefield, Jr. (1978-
2013) 
35 
Third Circuit   
 In re Plassein Int’l Corp., 366 
B.R. 318 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) 
Kevin Gross (1978-2007) 
29 
 
 In re Elrod Holdings Corp., 394 
B.R. 760 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) 
Brendan Linehan Shannon 
(1992-2008) 
16 
 In re The IT Group, Inc., 359 
B.R. 97 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) 
Mary F. Walrath (1979-2006) 
33 
 
 In re Borden Chems. & Plastics 
Operating Ltd. P’ship, 336 B.R. 
214 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) 
Peter J. Walsh (1964-2006) 
42 
 In re Fin. Mgmt. Scis., Inc., 261 
B.R. 150 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
2001) 
Bernard Markovitz (1965-2001) 
36 
 
 In re Loranger Mfg. Corp., 324 
B.R. 575 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
2005) 
Judith K. Fitzgerald (1973-
2005) 
32 
 
Fourth Circuit   
 In re Blanton, 105 B.R. 321 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) 
Douglas O. Tice, Jr. (1957-
1989) 
32 
 
 
2. Data obtained from Westlaw Next Profiler 
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 In re Derivium Capital, LLC, 
437 B.R. 798 (Bankr. D. S.C. 
2010) 
John E. Waites (1980-2010) 
30 
 In re U.S. Mortg. Corp., 491 
B.R. 642 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2013) 
Rosemary Gambardella (1979-
2013) 
34 
 
Fifth Circuit   
 In re Olympic Natural Gas Co., 
258 B.R. 161 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2001) 
William R. Greendyke (1979-
2001) 
22 
Sixth Circuit   
 In re Quality Stores Inc., 355 
B.R. 629 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
2006) 
James D. Gregg (1977-2006) 
29 
 
 In re Grand Eagle Companies, 
Inc., 288 B.R. 484 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2003) 
Marilyn Shea-Stonum (1975-
2003) 
28 
Seventh Circuit   
 In re Lancelot Investors Fund, 
L.P., 467 B.R. 643 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 2012) 
Jacqueline P. Cox (1978-2012) 
34 
 In re Renew Energy LLC, 463 
B.R. 475 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 
2011) 
Robert D. Martin (1969-2011) 
33 
 
Eighth Circuit   
 In re Contemporary Indus. 
Corp.,  2007 WL 5256918 
(Bankr. D. Neb. 2007)  
Timothy J. Mahoney (1972-
2007) 
35 
 
Ninth Circuit   
 In re Comark, 124 B.R. 806 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) 
In re Comark, 145 B.R. 47 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992) 
James N. Barr (1972-1991) 
19 
Elizabeth L. Perris (1976-1992) 
16 
 In re Hamilton Taft & Co., 176 
B.R. 895 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
1995)  
Thomas E. Carlson (1976-1995) 
19 
Tenth Circuit   
47
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 In re Yeagley, 220 B.R. 402 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1998) 
John T. Flannagan (1964-1998) 
34 
Eleventh Circuit   
    
 Total Bankruptcy: 20 
 
Years Total: 588 /20 
Average: 29.40 
The average appellate judge 
practiced bankruptcy for 29.40 
years prior to issuing a decision 
holding that § 546(e) applied 
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Appendix III 
Appellate Judges 
 
§ 546(e) Does NOT Apply to Protect Shareholders 
 
 Appellate Court Judge 
(No. years practicing bankruptcy prior to 
decision) 1 
First Circuit   
  
 
 
Second Circuit   
  
 
 
Third Circuit   
  
 
 
Fourth Circuit   
 
 
  
Fifth Circuit   
 Wider v. Wootton, 907 
F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1990) 
Samuel D. Johnson, Jr. - 0 
Seventh Circuit   
  
 
 
Eighth Circuit   
  
 
 
Ninth Circuit   
  
 
 
Tenth Circuit   
  
 
 
Eleventh Circuit   
 In re Munford, Inc., 98 
F.3d 604 (11th Cir. 1996) 
Per curiam – 0 
                                                          
1
. Data obtained from Westlaw Next Profiler 
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 Total Appellate: 2 Years Total: 0/2 
Average: 0 
The average appellate judge practiced 
bankruptcy for 0 years prior to issuing a 
decision holding that § 546(e) did not ap-
ply 
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§ 546(e) Applies to Protect Shareholders 
 
 
 
Appellate Court Judge 
(No. years practicing bankruptcy pri-
or to decision)2 
First Circuit   
  
 
 
Second Circuit   
 In re Enron Creditors Re-
covery Corp., 651 F.3d 329 
(2d Cir. 2011) 
John M. Walker, Jr. - 0 
Third Circuit   
 In re Plassein Int’l Corp., 
590 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 
2009) 
Morton Ira Greenberg - 0 
 In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 
181 F.3d 505 (3d Cir. 
1999) 
Richard Lowell Nygaard- 0 
Fourth Circuit   
 In re Derivium Capital 
LLC, 716 F.3d 355,(4th 
Cir. 2013) 
James Andrew Wynn Jr. - 0 
Fifth Circuit   
 In re Olympic Natural Gas 
Co., 294 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 
2002) 
Emilio M. Garza - 0 
 In re MBS Mgmt. Servs., 
Inc., 690 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 
2012) 
Edith H. Jones - 9 
Sixth Circuit   
 In re QSI Holdings, Inc., 
571 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 
2009) 
Alan E. Norris - 0 
Seventh Circuit   
   
                                                          
2
. Data obtained from Westlaw Next Profiler 
51
  
2014] IS IT LAW OR SOMETHING ELSE? 1319 
 
 
Eighth Circuit   
 Contemporary Indus. Corp. 
v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981 (8th 
Cir. 2009) 
Clarence Arlen Beam - 0 
Ninth Circuit   
 In re Comark, 971 F.2d 
322 (9th Cir. 1992) 
Melvin T. Brunetti - 0 
 In re Hamilton Taft & Co., 
114 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 
1997) 
William A. Norris – 0  
Tenth Circuit   
 Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Charles Schwab & Co., 
Inc., 913 F.2d 846 (10th 
Cir. 1990) 
Stephen H. Anderson - 0 
 In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 
952 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 
1991) 
Stephen H. Anderson – 0  
Eleventh Circuit   
    
 Total Appellate: 12 Years Total: 9/12 
Average: 0.75 
The average appellate judge practiced 
bankruptcy for 0.75 years prior to 
issuing a decision holding that § 
546(e) applied 
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